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14.1  Introduction 
The intertemporal consequences of fiscal policies in the Netherlands are tra- 
ditionally assessed on the basis of the budget deficit, public debt, and net gov- 
ernment wealth. The explicit analysis of the impact of fiscal policy on the wel- 
fare of currently living generations and generations that are yet to be born has 
received only little attention.' Generational accounting provides a tool for the 
investigation of  the  intergenerational  distributional  effects  of  fiscal policy. 
Moreover, its forward-looking properties allow one to explore how various fu- 
ture developments affect the sustainability of public finances. In particular, in 
the decades to come, the prospective aging of the population and the depletion 
of  natural gas reserves are expected to put a substantial burden on public fi- 
nances in the Netherlands. At the same time, increasing participation of the 
middle-aged in the labor force and increasing taxable income from funded 
private pension schemes are expected to alleviate this burden by strengthening 
the tax base. Generational accounting is comprehensive in that it includes all 
budget items (i.e., both spending and taxes). Hence, it provides a useful frame- 
work for exploring how future developments and fiscal policy interact in af- 
fecting the sustainability of public finances and the welfare of various genera- 
tions, thereby offering policymakers an explicit equity choice. 
Generational accounting yields two important measures. The first one is the 
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level of the net tax burden (the gross tax burden minus gross transfers) on fu- 
ture generations. It is found residually from the intertemporal government bud- 
get constraint and the net benefits that currently living generations derive from 
current fiscal policy. Accordingly, future generations are assumed to absorb the 
entire adjustment required to make the claims of various generations consistent 
with the intertemporal budget constraint. The level of the net tax burden  on 
future generations is highly sensitive to the level of government purchases be- 
cause generational  accounts do not assign the incidence of  public purchases 
to generatiom2 
The second measure is the difference between the tax burden on newborns 
(these are the youngest members of the current generations), whose net tax bur- 
den depends on current fiscal rules unconstrained by the government budget 
constraint, and the tax burden on future generations, whose net tax burden is 
determined residually  from the government budget constraint rather than on 
the basis of current rules. The tax burdens on these two generations are compa- 
rable because they both apply to an entire lifetime. Measuring the generational 
imbalance as the difference between these two tax burdens yields two further 
advantages. First, the difference measure is much less sensitive to the level of 
government purchases. Second, it provides a measure for the sustainability of 
public finances. If the net burdens of newborn and future generations coincide, 
current fiscal policy is consistent with the government budget constraint and is 
thus sustainable. However, if future generations bear a heavier tax burden than 
newborns do, current fiscal rules will have to be adjusted in the future to meet 
the budget constraint. In view of these two advantages, this paper will focus 
on the second measure, that is, the difference between the tax burdens of new- 
born and future generations.’ 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After providing a historical 
overview of Dutch fiscal policies (section 14.2) and briefly describing our data 
sources (section  14.3), we present our results  in section  14.4. The standard 
method of applying generational accounting yields a generational imbalance 
of $87,600, or 17.1 percent of projected lifetime income. However, if the im- 
pact of  increasing labor participation and rising pension incomes on the tax 
base is taken into account, the generational imbalance declines to $24,300, or 
4.7 percent of lifetime income. In subsection 14.4.3 we explore the effects of 
assigning the benefits of government purchases and the public capital stock to 
generations. Section 14.5 explores various policy reforms aimed at establish- 
ing generational balance. Section 14.6  contains the conclusions. 
2. However, subsection 14.4.3 distributes the benefits from these purchases over generations. 
This allows us to more readily interpret the net tax burden on future generations as the net “debt” 
that current generations shift onto future generations. 
3. A further advantage of this measure compared to the first measure is that it is less sensitive 
to the allocation of benefits over the life cycle, which is sometimes rather arbitrary. 327  Generational Accounts for the Netherlands 
14.2  Historical Overview of Fiscal Policy 
The Capital Principle. During the first decade after the Second World War, the 
Netherlands applied the capital principle to the national budget. This principle 
involves a tax-financed current budget and a debt-financed capital budget. By 
prohibiting debt financing of current spending, net government wealth is pro- 
tected. However, fiscal policy in the early fifties was actually tighter than pre- 
scribed by the capital principle in order to cut the extremely high level of gov- 
ernment debt inherited from the war. 
Fine-Tuning. During a short period in the second half of the fifties, the budget 
was used to pursue activist, countercyclical Keynesian policies. However, ex- 
perience  with  countercyclical  policies was  unfavorable  because  it was em- 
ployed in an asymmetric fashion; whereas demand was stimulated in a weak 
economy, it was barely curbed in a boom. Moreover, identifying the turning 
points in the business cycle proved to be too difficult for successfully fine- 
tuning fiscal policy. 
Structural Fiscal Policy. A structural budget norm ended activist fiscal policy 
in the beginning of the sixties. While fine-tuning was abolished, automatic sta- 
bilizers were allowed to stabilize the economy. Accordingly, the actual deficit 
was permitted to differ from its structural level. The structural deficit norm 
was derived so that government borrowing would match the structural level of 
net saving in the private sector, adjusted for a desired structural surplus on the 
current account of the balance of payments to finance development aid. Based 
on the trend rate of economic growth, the so-called structural budgetary room 
was established, which defined the resources available for either tax cuts or 
spending increases. This enhanced overall budget discipline by  strengthening 
the position of the finance minister. 
Containing the Tax Burden. In the midseventies, without abandoning the struc- 
tural deficit norm, a new norm was introduced in order to contain the tax bur- 
den. In particular, the rise of the tax burden as a percentage of GDP was limited 
to 1 percentage point per annum. 
Cutting the Actual DeJicit. Structural fiscal policy began to show serious weak- 
nesses at the end of the seventies. The projected trend growth rate proved to be 
too optimistic, resulting in surging fiscal deficits. In the early eighties, during 
the most serious economic slowdown since the Second World War, Dutch fiscal 
policy got seriously out of hand. The fiscal deficit rose to almost 10 percent of 
GDP (see fig. 14.1). Moreover, revenues from natural gas proved to be rather 
volatile due to changes in oil prices. At that time, taxation and social security 
contributions accounted for nearly 50 percent of GDP. The structural budget 328  A. Lans Bovenberg and Harry ter Rele 
% GDP 
loo  c 
Fiscal deficit 
% GDP 





01  """'"""'""""""~  -2 
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995 
Fig. 14.1  Public finances, 1970-97 
norm was replaced by  a norm for the actual deficit. Indeed, deficit reduction 
was to become the leading issue for more than a decade and three successive 
cabinets. In view of the high tax burden, fiscal adjustment was pursued through 
expenditure cutbacks. 
The Present Situation. By the time the deficit had reached a more sustainable 
level in the beginning of the nineties, the scope for a more long-term-oriented 
fiscal policy reemerged. Indeed, two important lessons have been learned from 
the experience of fiscal policy in the eighties and early nineties. First, the tar- 
gets for cuts in the actual fiscal deficit made budgetary policy rather sensitive 
to the cycle. Spending overruns were accommodated in booms. During slumps, 
in contrast, spending had to be cut substantially to meet the targets for the 
actual deficits. To  avoid unrest in the budgetary process and to better control 
spending, the present government has set a ceiling on public expenditure for 
the period 1994-98,  which more or less excludes any rise in real terms. So the 
deficit is allowed to fluctuate  with  tax receipts up to a certain limit,  above 
which measures have to be taken to cut the actual deficit. The second lesson 
from fiscal policy in the beginning of the nineties is that a government program 
based on a favorable economic outlook can seriously disrupt the budgetary 
process if growth turns out to be slower than anticipated. Accordingly, the pres- 
ent coalition has estimated receipts from taxation and social security contribu- 
tions on the basis of  a cautious economic scenario, which  assumes that the 
economy grows only at a modest rate of 2 percent. 329  Generational Accounts for the Netherlands 
The Economic and Monetary  Union Criteria. The Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) convergence criteria set by the Maastricht Treaty are an impor- 
tant yardstick for fiscal policy. Whereas the fiscal deficit in 1997 is projected 
to satisfy the norm of 3 percent of GDP, the stock of government debt (at about 
77 percent of  GDP in  1996) still violates the EMU ceiling of  60 percent of 
GDP. Therefore, the government intends to use the treaty’s “escape clause,” 
which states that in case public debt exceeds the 60 percent norm, it should be 
declining at a reasonable rate. Indeed, general government gross debt fell by 
more than 5 percent of GDP in 1997 to just below 72 percent of GDP, in part 
due to a one-off reduction in the government account at the Dutch central bank. 
Future Fiscal Policy and Aging. In recent years, several analysts have argued 
that the prospective aging of the population requires a further reduction of the 
fiscal deficit, thereby substantially cutting public debt. This would allow lower 
future interest payments to compensate for the rising cost of  old-age benefits 
and health care. The generational accounting approach pursued in this paper is 
intended to provide more insights on how aging affects the public finances. 
14.3  Data Sources 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS), the official Dutch statistical bureau, supplies 
the data on the present situation. Projections of future economic variables were 
derived from CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, the in- 
dependent government bureau  producing the  official macroeconomic fore- 
casts. CPB constructed the data on the 1995 budget on the basis of  national 
accounts data provided by CBS. The age profiles for taxes were derived from 
Deelen (1995), which  in  turn  drew its data from a large household survey 
(Woningbehoefteonderzoek) performed by  CBS. This latter bureau also pro- 
duced the demographic projections. The other future variables are derived from 
CPB projections. In particular, the long-term scenario analysis of CPB (1992) 
provided the main guide for future changes expected to take place in the pri- 
vate sector. 
14.4  Basic Findings and Sensitivity Analysis 
The first part of this section explores the intergenerational effects of current 
fiscal policies. The second part conducts some sensitivity analyses with respect 
to future economic developments. The final part explores the sensitivity of the 
results with respect to an alternative method of  generational accounting that 
assigns the incidence of not only taxes and transfers but also government pur- 
chases to generations. 330  A. Lans Bovenberg and Harry ter Rele 
Table 14.1  Generational Imbalance (present value in thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Variant 2  Variant 3  Variant 4 
(including  (including  (including 
Variant 1  increasing  higher private  flattening of 
(standard)  participation)  pensions)  wage profile) 
Net taxes paid by 
Newborns  49.4  63.0  65.2  65.8 
Future generations  137.0  95.8  81.9  90.1 
Generational imbalance 
In dollar terms  87.6  32.8  16.7  24.3 
As a percentage difference  177.1  52.0  25.6  36.9 
As a percentage of 
lifetime income  17.1  6.4  3.3  4.7 
Notes: Real income growth assumed to be 1.5 percent; discount rate, 5 percent. 
the changes included in the previous variant. 
The variants are cumulative. Hence, in addition to the change in parentheses, each variant includes also 
14.4.1  Current Fiscal Policy 
We first apply the standard method for calculating generational accounts to 
the nether land^.^ This standard method, however, ignores several important 
future changes in the Dutch economic environment affecting the life cycle pat- 
tern of taxes. These changes include, first, an increase in labor force participa- 
tion; second, the maturing of private, funded pension funds; and, third, a flat- 
tening of the age-earnings profile. We discuss how sensitive the generational 
accounts are with respect to these three developments by incorporating them 
step by step. 
Standard Method 
The standard practice in generational accounting assumes that the age pro- 
files of  the various taxes and transfers  change only with legislated  or very 
likely policy reforms. Our first variant (variant 1) employs this traditional ap- 
proach. The basis for the extrapolation of policies is the projected budget in 
1998, when the present government completes its legislative peri~d.~  This bud- 
get incorporates the effects of  all policies agreed on by  the political parties 
making up the present government. In addition, for the period beyond  1998, 
we account for the lagged impact of already legislated measures that restrict 
the eligibility for disability and survivor benefits. Variant 1 in table 14.1 reveals 
that current policies appear to be unsustainable, as they benefit current genera- 
tions at the expense of future generations. In particular, whereas newborns pay 
4. In particular, we assume that social security premiums are constant and do not endogenously 
respond to changes in social security spending in order to maintain balance in the social security 
accounts. 
5. For the period between 1995 and 1998, we adopt the realized and projected budget figures 
contained in CPB (1996). 331  Generational Accounts for the Netherlands 
Table 14.2  Present Value of Future Net Tax Payments per Capita (thousands of 
U.S. dollars; constant prices, adjusted for income growth) 
Generation’s 
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Nore: Real income growth assumed to be 1.5 percent; discount rate, 5 percent. 
only $49,400 in net lifetime taxes, future generations bear a lifetime tax burden 
of  $137,000. The difference in the tax burden between newborns and future 
generations amounts to 17.1 percent of lifetime income. 
Table 14.2 (variant 1) shows that the present values of net tax payments over 
the remaining lifetimes of presently living generations vary substantially with 
age. The young and middle-aged are net contributors to the budget over their 
remaining lifetimes. The elderly, in contrast, are net beneficiaries. This lifetime 
pattern reflects the age profile of both public spending and revenue. 
Figure 14.2 contains the age profile of benefits from aggregate public spend- 
ing (excluding government purchases) and its main components. It indicates 
that benefits from social security rise with age. This pattern is due mainly to 
public old-age benefits, which are paid only to citizens over 65 years old, and 
disability benefits, which increase with age for those younger than 65  years. 
Benefits from health care also rise strongly with age. 
Figure 14.3 reveals that revenues also vary with age. Until about age 50, 332  A. Lans Bovenberg and Harry ter Rele 
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Fig. 14.2  Age profile of expenditures, 1995 
Fig. 14.3  Age profile of taxes, 1995 
labor incomes (and hence tax revenues from these incomes) rise with age, ex- 
plaining the upward slope in the tax profile. Beyond age 50, tax payments fall 
because participation in the labor force gradually decreases. The declining la- 
bor incomes are not fully offset by various forms of pension income, which 
are subject to income tax. Accordingly, both income taxes (which include so- 
cial security premiums) and indirect taxes (which are linked to net income) fall 
with age. Compared to indirect taxes, direct taxes drop more rapidly at age 65 
because individuals over 65 years old are exempt from contributing to various 
social security schemes, including the public old-age  scheme. Overall, com- 
pared to the middle-aged, the elderly contribute significantly less to the budget. 
Combining the expenditure and revenue sides of the budget, figure 14.4 shows 
the age profile of total net contribution to the government budget. 
Rising Labor Force Participation 
The standard practice in generational accounting implicitly assumes that the 
currently observed rate of labor force participation remains constant in the fu- 333  Generational Accounts for the Netherlands 
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Table 14.3  Participation Rates of Various Age Groups in Full-Time Equivalents, 
1995 and 2020 
202P 
Age Group  1995  Low  Base  High 
~~  ~ 
20-34  73.1  76.6  75.P  77.2 
35-49  72.0  79.2  84.1  86.2 
50-64  37.7  43.7  55.3  60.5 
Total  64.1  65.3  70.5  73.9 
Source: CBSICPB (1997). 
'Adjusted for rise in part-time employment. 
"his  rate is lower than the corresponding rate in the low scenario because the young spend more 
years in  full-time education in the base scenario. The resulting higher stock of human capital 
allows them to  participate at higher rates in later years. 
ture. For the Netherlands, this assumption is unrealistic. This country has tradi- 
tionally featured a low participation rate of women. Over the past decade, how- 
ever, the participation rate of women has started to rise sharply and is expected 
to continue to increase substantially in the future. Rising educational levels of 
women  contribute to this development. Indeed, lower fertility not only gives 
rise to aging but also boosts participation of women. Recent policy measures 
limiting eligibility for disability benefits are expected to further increase labor 
force participation, especially of the elderly. 
A higher participation rate widens the tax base by raising labor incomes. To 
account for this effect, variant 2 assumes that taxes paid by  a particular age 
group depend not only on labor productivity and the number of people in that 
group but also on the projected labor force participation rate of the age group 
involved. Table 14.3 compares current age-specific  participation rates with pro- 
jections of these participation rates in 2020 for three alternative scenarios. The 334  A. Lans Bovenberg and Harry ter Rele 
Table 14.4  Assets of Pension Funds, 1991 
Country 
Assets 
(% of GDP) 
Netherlands”  75.9 
United Kingdom  60.1 
France  4.6 
Denmark  51.6 
Belgium  10.5 
Germany”  15.5 
Source: Report by the European Commission’s Network of Experts on Supplementary Pensions. 
“1992. 
projections for the base case imply that the participation rate of those between 
20 and 64 years of age (adjusted for the rise in part-time employment) will rise 
by  about 10 percent (or 6.4 percentage points) between 1995 and 2020. The 
older age groups are expected to feature the largest boost in labor force partici- 
pation. 
The higher participation rate reduces the generational imbalance substan- 
tially. The net tax burden borne by  future generations falls from $137,000 in 
variant 1 to $95,800 in variant 2 (see table 14.1). In the latter variant, the tax 
burden exceeds that of newborns by  only $32,800 (compared to $87,600 in 
variant 1). 
Rising Pension Incomes 
A projected increase in private pension incomes is the second factor requir- 
ing an adjustment of the age profile. Public pension benefits in the Netherlands 
are flat (i.e., unrelated to income) so that the public benefit level is relatively 
low for middle- and high-income earners. For these income groups, collective 
labor  agreements supplement the public  benefits with  compulsory  occupa- 
tional pension provisions. These provisions are financed by  funded pensions 
funds, which have accumulated financial assets sizable by  international stan- 
dards (see table  14.4). During the coming decades these funds are expected 
to mature so that an increasing part of  the population will have accumulated 
substantial pension rights when reaching retirement age. 
Higher pension incomes strengthen the tax base because retirement benefits 
are subject to income tax, while indirect taxes are levied on consumption out 
of  these benefits. Variant 3 assumes that average net income of  an individual 
over 65 years of age relative to that of an individual between 35 and 49 years 
will rise from 78 to 85 percent between 1995 and 2020.6  The resulting increase 
in tax payments alleviates the generational imbalance further; future genera- 
6. These figures are derived from Deelen (1995) and the “European Renaissance” scenario in 
CPB (1992). This scenario employs projections about future labor force participation similar to 
the base case in table 14.3. 335  Generational Accounts for the Netherlands 
tions now pay only $16,700 (3.3 percent of lifetime income) more in lifetime 
taxes than newborns do (table 14.1). 
Flatter Age-Earnings Profile 
The third phenomenon that calls for an adjustment of the future age profile 
of taxes is the expected flattening of the age-earnings profile. Wages currently 
rise rather sharply with age. A number of developments, however, are expected 
to reduce wages of  elderly workers compared to wages of  the young. First, 
market forces increasingly link wages to productivity, thereby reducing the im- 
portance of implicit lifetime labor contracts in firms. Second, the aging of the 
labor force renders younger workers more scarce compared to older workers. 
Variant 4 assumes that wages of  young workers 20 years old will increase 
by  9 percent relative to the average wage between 1995 and 2020. A worker 
45 years old will experience an average rise in wages. Wages of older workers 
60 years old will lag the average by  10 percent.’  The flattening of  the age 
profile of  earnings dampens the rise in tax revenues due to a change in the 
composition of the labor force toward older workers with higher wages. Hence, 
it reduces the improvement in the generational imbalance brought about by 
higher pension incomes and a higher participation rate. Indeed, variant 4 shows 
a slight rise of the generational imbalance (compared to variant 3) to $24,300, 
or 4.7 percent of lifetime income (see table 14.1). 
The Preferred Case 
We  believe variant 4 best reflects the impact of future developments on the 
intergenerational stance of current fiscal policies. Table  14.2 and figure 14.5 
provide more detailed information on the differences between the standard 
variant 1 and our preferred variant 4. Table  14.2 indicates how the additional 
tax payments in variant 4 are distributed over currently living generations (in 
present value terms). Figure 14.5 shows the additional current contributions of 
each age group to the budget in 2020 (in variant 4 compared to variant 1). 
14.4.2  Sensitivity Analyses 
Interest and Growth Rates 
Table  14.5 shows how sensitive the results are with respect to interest and 
productivity growth rates. A higher interest rate tends to lower the generational 
imbalance as measured by the difference in the present value of taxes paid by 
future generations and newborns. The opposite holds for higher productivity 
growth. However, the dependency on these factors is typically reversed if the 
generational imbalances are expressed as ratios of  the present value of  life- 
time incomes. 
7. These assumptions are based on the  “European Renaissance” scenario in CPB (1992) and 
Deelen ( 1995). 336  A. Lans Bovenberg and Harry ter Rele 
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Fig. 14.5  Age profile of total net taxes in 2020: variants 1 and 4 
Labor Force Participation 
The variants discussed in subsection 14.4.1 employed a base-case assump- 
tion for the expected growth of labor force participation. However, in view of 
the considerable uncertainty surrounding this variable, CPB has constructed 
two alternative scenarios for the future development of the participation rate 
(see  table  14.3).s All  three  scenarios  involve an  increase  in  participation. 
Whereas the “low” case projects only an accumulated 2 percent growth until 
2020, the “high” case involves an accumulated growth of 15 percent. This com- 
pares to 10 percent growth in the base case. 
Table 14.6 reveals that the generational imbalance is rather sensitive to labor 
supply. Indeed, in the scenario featuring high labor participation, the additional 
labor supply offsets the effect of aging so that future generations actually con- 
tribute less to the budget than newborns do. This reveals that a high level of 
labor supply is an important factor in supporting sustainable public finances. 
Demographic Developments 
Table 14.7 explores the sensitivity of the generational accounts with respect 
to demographic assumptions. Column (2) of the table contains the accounts if 
the age structure remains constant. It reveals that without aging, future gener- 
ations would benefit substantially more from the budget than present gener- 
ations do. In particular, compared to current generations, they would enjoy an 
additional lifetime benejit  of  $84,000 (16 percent  of  lifetime income). This 
compares with an additional burden of  $24,000 (4.7 percent  of  lifetime in- 
come) if  the prospective change in age structure is taken into account. This 
contrast  reveals  that  aging  puts  a  heavy  burden  on public  finances. These 
8. Pomp (1996) describes how these scenarios are constructed. Table 14.5  Generational Accounts (present value in thousands of US.  dollars) 
g=1  g = 1.5  g=2 
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Table 14.6  Sensitivity Analysis: Participation Rate (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Average 
Low  Participation 
Participation  (variant 4) 
High 
Participation 
Net taxes of 
Newborns 
Future generations 
60.2  65.8 
115.4  90.1 
Generational imbalance 
In dollar terms  55.2  24.3 
As a percentage difference  92  37 
As a percentage of lifetime income  10.8  4.7 





-  1.8 
2.4 
Table 14.7  Sensitivity Analysis: Demographics (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Variant 4 
(middle  Low  High 
birthrate,  No Change  Birthrate,  Birthrate, 
high life  in Age  High Life  Low Life 
expectancy)  Structure  Expectancy  Expectancy 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Net taxes paid by 
Newborns  66  90  66  67 
Future generations  90  6  87  84 
Generational imbalance 
In dollar terms  24  -  84  21  17 
As a percentage 
difference  37  -93  32  26 
As a percentage of 
lifetime income  4.7  ~  16.4  4.1  3.3 
results underscore the merits of the forward-looking  quality of  intergenera- 
tional accounting. 
The assumption of a constant age structure, while useful for analytical pur- 
poses, is clearly not realistic. To further pursue the sensitivity analysis with 
respect  to demographic  developments,  we employ  alternative demographic 
scenarios provided by  Statistics Netherlands. In particular, we construct two 
variants with rather extreme assumptions for the aging of  the population. To 
analyze the impact of substantial aging, the first variant combines the assump- 
tion of a low birthrate with that of high life expectancy. The other variant con- 
siders the other extreme case by assuming that a high birthrate coincides with 
low life expectancy. Table 14.8 displays the effects of these alternative assump- 
tions on the elderly dependency ratio. Columns (3) and (4) of table 14.7 show 
that the consequences of alternative demographic assumptions for the genera- 339  Generational Accounts for the Netherlands 
Table 14.8  Elderly Dependency Ratios, 1995-2060 
Alternative Assumptions 
Base Case 
(middle birthrate,  Low Birthrate,  High Birthrate, 
Year  high life expectancy)  High Life Expectancy  Low Life Expectancy 
1995  .20 
2020  .3  1 
2040  .45 









Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
Note: Elderly dependency ratio is the number of people aged 65 or older as a percentage of the 
number of people aged 18 to 64. 
Table 14.9  Sensitivity Analysis: Health Care Costs (thousands  of U.S. dollars) 
Additional Cost 
Rise between  Shift of 
variant 4  1998 and2020  Age Profile 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Net taxes paid by 
Newborns 
Future generations 
66  57  67 
90  120  80 
Generational imbalance 
In dollar terms  24  62  13 
As a percentage of lifetime income  4.7  12.1  2.5 
As a percentage difference  37  109  20 
tional accounts are relatively minor. The imbalance falls to 4.1 percent of life- 
time income in the first case and to 3.3 percent in the second. 
The Costs of Health Care 
The assumption that (age-specific)  costs of health care will grow in line with 
productivity might not be realistic. In  particular, an increase in the relative 
price of health care services combined with low price elasticity for these ser- 
vices might boost the growth of these expenditures (the so-called Baumol ef- 
fect). A high income elasticity of health care could further reinforce this cost 
increase. Table 14.9 explores how sensitive the generational accounts are with 
respect to the future development of publicly financed health care. We assume 
no corresponding tax increase and therefore a shift of these additional costs to 
future generations. Column (2) of the table reveals that an additional increase 
in the cost of  publicly provided health care of  1 percent per year during the 
period  1998-2020  substantially widens the generational imbalance from 4.7 
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Our analysis has assumed that the age profile of health costs is not affected 
by the increase in life expectancy. An alternative assumption is that as life ex- 
pectancy rises, an increased portion of the elderly experience good health (see 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 1996). In that case, 
the consumption of health services is concentrated more in the period immedi- 
ately before death. To explore the sensitivity of the generational accounts with 
respect to alternative assumptions in this respect, we shift the age profile of the 
cost of health care for the elderly by assuming that these costs are directly re- 
lated to the number of deaths. In particular, from age 60 on, the age profile of 
health care is shifted by an increasing margin until it reaches at age 70 a max- 
imum of  1.6 years, being the expected increase in life expectancy. This shift is 
assumed to occur gradually between 1998 and 2020. Column (3) of table 14.9 
shows that a healthier elderly population would reduce the generational imbal- 
ance to 2.5 percent of lifetime income. 
14.4.3 
The standard practice in generational accounting does not assign the benefits 
of government purchases to generations. Moreover, it does not distinguish be- 
tween public consumption and public investment. This section modifies this 
practice. In particular, we evenly assign over all currently living generations 
the benefits of both government consumption9 and the public capital  stock. 
These latter benefits are computed as an imputed rent from the public capital 
stock.Io 
This alternative treatment of investment improves the generational imbal- 
ance significantly (see variant 5 in table 14.  lo). In fact, the public finances turn 
out to be almost sustainable: the net contribution of newborns almost equals 
that of future generations. The main reason for the further improvement in the 
generational imbalance is that the present level of public investment exceeds 
the level that is needed to have the public capital stock grow in line with the 
growth of the economy. 
With the assignment of the incidence of government purchases, the net tax 
burden on future generations measures fiscal “debt” shifted to future genera- 
tions.” Table 14.10 reveals that future generations receive a net benefit from 
the government of $64,100, or 12.5 percent of lifetime income. Accordingly, 
current and past generations do not appear to employ fiscal policy to impose a 
burden on future generations. 
The Benefits of Government Purchases 
9. We assume here that aggregate benefits correspond to the value of spending. 
10. In particular, we compute the imputed rent as depreciation plus the product of the interest 
rate and the public capital stock. The initial stock of  government wealth includes the physical 
capital stock of the government. 
1 I. This is the level measure discussed in the introduction. If we do not assign the benefits from 
these purchases to generations, the level of  the tax burden measures not only this “debt” but also 
the level of  government purchases. 341  Generational Accounts for the Netherlands 
Table 14.10  Assigning the Incidence of Government Purchases (thousands of 
U.S. dollars) 
Variant 4  Variant 5 
(not assigning benefits)  (assigning benefits) 




In dollar terms 
As a percentage difference 











Table 14.11  Policies to Achieve Generational Balance: Variant 4 
Immediate and Permanent 
Change in Item 
Item  % of Item Itself  % of GDP 
Government purchases"  -1.9  -1.0 
All taxes  2.4  1  .O 
Income tax  4.3  1.1 
Health  -9.9  -  .9 
Education  -24.0  -1.1 
Transfer payments net of  taxes  -6.1  -1.0 
Nure: Real income growth assumed to be 1.5 percent; discount rate, 5 percent. 
'Government  purchases comprise expenditures on defense, general government, and government 
investment. 
14.5  Generational Impact of Alternative Policies 
The first part of this section explores a number of policy reforms designed 
to eliminate the generational imbalance. The second part analyzes the effects 
of some policy measures that are currently under debate in the Netherlands to 
contain the burden of aging on the public finances. 
14.5.1  Establishing Generational Balance 
Table 14.11 indicates the required adjustments for ensuring sustainable pub- 
lic finances by establishing generational balance in our preferred case (variant 
4; see subsection 14.4.1). It explores this adjustment for a number of budget 
items in turn. As could be expected from the small generational imbalance in 
variant 4, the required policy changes are modest. Indeed, an (immediate and 
permanent) adjustment in one of these budget items of about 1 percent of GDP 
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Table 14.12  Effects of Balancing Measures on Tax Burden Borne by Several 
Generations (present value in thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Future 
Item  Generations  Newborn  30-Year-Old  60-Year-Old 
Government purchases  -24.3  0  0  0 
All taxes  -  18.6  5.7  8.9  3.2 
Income tax  -18.4  5.9  9.2  2.4 
Transfer payments net of taxes  -  19.4  4.8  7.0  8.1 
Health  -  19.6  4.7  6.3  8.6 
Education  -9.7  14.6  0  0 
These required adjustments,  when expressed as percentages of  GDP,  are 
about the same for all budget items-irrespective  of their age profiles. Table 
14.12, however, indicates that the measures yield quite different effects on the 
level of welfare of the various generations. In particular, future generations 
benefit most from changes in budget items affecting the end of the life cycle, 
such as health and transfer payments. 
14.5.2  Effects of Measures Currently under Debate 
In order to reduce the burden of aging on the public finances, Dutch politi- 
cians are discussing several policy reforms. This subsection investigates the 
impact of these reforms on the sustainability of public finances and the net tax 
burden on future generations. 
Taring the Elderly 
Individuals over 65 years of age are currently exempt from contributing to a 
number of  social security schemes, including the public old-age scheme. It 
has been suggested that the elderly with supplementary occupational pensions 
should contribute to the public old-age scheme. In this way, not only the young 
but also the elderly with higher incomes would help to finance the flat public 
pension benefit. For the elderly, the net effect of  the measure is an income tax 
rise of  40 percent and a reduction in indirect taxes paid of 8 percent. Table 
14.13 shows that gradually abolishing the exemption between 1998 and 2020 
reduces the generational imbalance by 42 percent. Suddenly eliminating the 
exemption in 1999 reduces this imbalance by 52 percent by harming those who 
are currently close to retirement (see the effect on 60-year-olds in table 14.13). 
Additional Public Saving 
Another policy option currently under debate is to accumulate a social secu- 
rity fund designed to finance some of the additional public pensions for the 
baby boom generations. We assume that this fund is accumulated by additional 
public savings rather than a higher deficit in the rest of the public accounts. 
Hence, this policy package resembles  the measures analyzed  in subsection 
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Table 14.13  Taxing the Elderly (thousands  of U.S. dollars) 
Taxing the Elderly  Taxing the Elderly 
Variant 4  Gradually  Immediately 
Taxes paid by 
60-year-olds  -40.3  -  36.5 
30-year-olds  245.4  248.7 
Newborns  65.8  67.2 
Future generations  90.1  81.3 






Table 14.14  Raising Public Saving (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Higher Indirect 
variant 4  Taxes 





40  40 
245  247 
66  67 
90  86 
Generational imbalance 
In dollar terms  24  19 
As a percentage difference  37  29 
As a percentage of lifetime income  4.7  3.7 
billion guilders (0.21 percent of GDP). This measure turns out to have only a 
rather small effect on the generational imbalance of  1  .O percent of lifetime in- 
come. (See table 14.14.) 
14.6  Conclusion 
This paper has provided two main contributions.  Its methodological contri- 
bution has been to show how generational accounting can accommodate pro- 
spective changes in the economic environment in the form of  an increasing 
participation rate, higher pension incomes, and a flatter age-eamings profile. 
Its  second main contribution involves the computation of  generational ac- 
counts for the Netherlands. The analysis indicates that the main factors affect- 
ing the intergenerational stance of present Dutch fiscal policies are the aging 
of  the population, the expected rise in future labor participation rates, rising 
incomes from private pensions, and high levels of public investment. The first 
factor threatens the sustainability of public finances and imposes a burden on 
future generations. The other factors help to reduce this burden. The race be- 
tween these factors appears to end close to a tie. The additional human capital 
of  women and the additional financial assets of pensioners more or less offset 344  A. Lans Bovenberg and Harry ter Rele 
28.0  --  Variant 4 
- 
the aging of  the population. This rather optimistic conclusion requires three 
important caveats. 
First, since the rise in participation occurs before the bulk of  the aging, the 
government will have to reduce the deficit in the next two dzcades to create 
room for higher age-related spending in later decades. Figure 14.6 indicates 
how the budget deficit will develop in the period until 2060 in our preferred 
variant 4. It reveals that present policies produce a soaring deficit, mainly due 
to an explosion of interest payments. This reflects the unsustainability signaled 
by the generational accounts. In figure 14.6 we show also how the deficit de- 
velops when indirect taxes are raised by an amount that suffices to secure a 
sustainable policy. In that case, the fiscal balance goes into surplus by 2002. 
Subsequently, it remains positive for about three decades in order to finance 
age-related spending. 
Second, the results are highly sensitive to projected labor force participation. 
Figure 14.6 demonstrates this by showing how the deficit develops in the high- 
participation case, which we referred to in subsection 14.4.2. It indicates that 
a policy aimed at raising labor force participation seems of great importance 
in order to ensure the sustainability of the public finances in an aging society. 
Accordingly, the government may want to stimulate labor supply by  further 
cutting taxes. This would require additional spending cuts. 
Third, our analysis does not include intergenerational redistribution occurring 
outside the government sector, for example, environmental externalities, inher- 
itances within families, and transfers of know-how. Moreover, we do not ex- 
plore the intergenerational redistribution performed by supplementary, occupa- 
tional pension schemes. Table 14.4 indicates that these schemes play a major 
role in  the Netherlands. If  interest rates turn out to be low compared to the 
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tions in the form of higher pension premiums in order to provide pension bene- 
fits to the elderly. 
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